Report Raises Concerns Over China’s Expanding Strategic and Military Footprint in Southeast Asia

The report suggests that Beijing may be pursuing an approach centred on dual-use infrastructure, in which facilities developed for civilian or cooperative purposes could also support military activities. Ports, airfields, logistics hubs and training centres are among the assets identified as having potential strategic applications.

Rather than relying exclusively on conventional overseas military bases, the report argues, China’s expanding infrastructure network could offer alternative ways to strengthen its regional position.

Laos Centre Draws Attention

The report points to the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Centre at Ban Keun as a development that has raised questions about Beijing’s military presence in mainland Southeast Asia.

The facility reportedly became operational and was inaugurated in September 2026. Satellite imagery cited by the report showed rapid construction activity, military vehicles and Chinese-made aircraft at the site.

Ban Keun is also described as a historically strategic location that was used by American forces during the Vietnam War. The report raises the possibility that the new centre could represent a significant expansion of China’s security presence in Laos, although the extent of its military role remains a central question.

Belt and Road Projects and Strategic Influence

For years, the Chinese Communist Party has presented the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an economic programme designed to improve connectivity, infrastructure and development.

However, the report argues that developments in Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar point to a broader geopolitical dimension to some Chinese-backed projects.

It notes that infrastructure financing from Chinese state-backed institutions can leave recipient countries with substantial debt obligations and deepen their dependence on Beijing for investment, trade and development assistance. Such economic relationships, the report argues, may also create opportunities for China to exercise political influence and seek strategic concessions.

The report does not suggest that every Chinese-funded infrastructure project has a military purpose, but highlights the potential overlap between economic connectivity and security interests.

Laos Becomes Increasingly Linked to China

Laos is presented as a prominent example of China’s growing economic presence in the region.

Chinese-backed hydropower projects play a major role in Laos’ electricity ambitions, while Chinese companies hold extensive mining concessions involving copper, gold and rare earth resources.

Agricultural production, including bananas, rubber and timber, is also closely connected to Chinese markets, according to the report.

Another major development is the China-Laos railway, which cost approximately $6 billion. The line has strengthened transport connectivity between the two countries and, in the report’s assessment, expanded China’s economic and strategic reach within Laos.

These links have increased the importance of China as an investor, trading partner and source of development financing for the landlocked Southeast Asian country.

Cambodia’s Naval Infrastructure Under Scrutiny

The report identifies a similar pattern in Cambodia, where China has become the country’s largest investor and a close political and economic partner over the past decade.

Chinese financing has supported roads, ports, industrial zones and energy infrastructure. At the same time, the development of the Ream Naval Base on Cambodia’s Gulf of Thailand coastline has attracted international attention over its potential strategic significance.

The report places these developments within the wider regional competition for influence, arguing that infrastructure investment can have implications beyond its immediate economic benefits.

It also points to changes in Myanmar’s international relationships following the 2021 military coup, suggesting that deteriorating relations between Myanmar and Western countries have created further opportunities for China to expand its influence.

Overall, the report argues that China’s growing economic and infrastructure footprint across Southeast Asia warrants scrutiny of how civilian development projects may intersect with long-term security interests. The extent to which individual facilities could support military operations, however, depends on their actual use and the arrangements governing access to them.